A Few Pitfalls in Canadian Judicial Writing

1.  Introduction

     My last blog examined the application of lawyers' conflicts law in a 2016 Ontario family dispute and identified one troubling judicial writing technique.  I ended my look at the case by noting that the use of first names in judgment writing could be perceived to be overly familiar or patronizing, and is especially troubling when used selectively. This blog follows from that point and looks at 3 additional pitfalls in judgment writing, that I think should also be avoided. 

2.  Background

     Approaches to judicial writing have been the focus of some critical attention in Canada.  I think it's fair to say that all adjudicative officials have a difficult and challenging job to write clear, logical and legally reasonable judgments.  Many, if not most Canadian judges, are effective communicators and avoid things like legal jargon to write "lucid"  decisions, as discussed in this interesting January 12, 2017 article by Daniela Murynka in The Walrus.
 
     However, the recent criticisms of judicial writing styles suggest there is some room for improvement.  The use of humour or irreverence in judicial writing, for example, risks wrongly highlighting the cleverness or erudition of the judge, instead of focusing on the parties, victims and those directly and indirectly affected by decisions, a point made, inter alia, by Alice Woolley in her recent post discussing The Problem of Judicial Arrogance.

     Within the context of this broader discussion about effective judgments I think there are 3 additional approaches to judicial writing that may also be problematic, discussed below.

3.  "The Law Should Not Be a Mystery Novel"1

     Remember last year's high profile court decision involving Canadian Senator Mike Duffy?  For several hours last April, the judge sat in an Ottawa courtroom reading his judgment aloud.  All the while social media was abuzz with journalists and others attempting to divine the final outcome, based largely on the spoken introductory comments of the judge.  . 

     Some of the frustration in awaiting the outcome in this case would have been alleviated if the judge had stated simply the results of his analysis in his introduction.  In this respect, judges should avoid being cryptic - writing in a way to make the judgment like a mystery, leaving everyone guessing.  As an aspect of 'point first' writing, I think its important for judgments to be up front about the determinations that are being made, based on the analysis later in a decision. 

     This 'point first' approach is consistent with legal writing best practices, such as those described by Ontario Court of Appeal judge John Laskin in his well known article for advocates, Forget the Wind Up and Make the Pitch.  This kind of directness in writing is especially important for judges, whose decisions may have a profound impact on those before the court, many of whom would undoubtedly simply like their matter resolved efficiently and effectively. Moreover, in the modern media age, the 'reading' of court decisions, without releasing a text in advance, seems both archaic and unnecessary. 

4.  Personal Anecdotes Should be Used Sparingly, Maybe Not At All

     For various reasons, judges sometimes insert personal stories into judgments.   At their best, these anecdotes are an example of 'judicial notice' that may highlight some important points being made in decisions or possibly demonstrate the courts' connection to the 'real world'.2

     At their worst though, such personal anecdotes may not be especially helpful to resolve legal issues and may serve to further focus attention on the decision-maker, as opposed to those before the court.  To return to the example of the Duffy decision set out above, the Court (at para 4) relayed a story of a homeless person asking the judge about the decision, to highlight the widespread attention the proceedings had received and also to emphasize the importance of the presumption of innocence. 

     Taken at face value, the Duffy example seems like reasonable example of the appropriate use of a personal story to introduce legal analysis.  But was it really necessary?  In the nation's capital, involving a well known Senator, high political intrigue, and questions about the integrity of Canadian federal government of the day, very few would have questioned the prominence of the legal decision.  Moreover, I recollect at least one comment on social media at the time to the effect that, by relating this personal story, the judge appeared to be "enjoying" the spotlight of attention the case had received.

     I have little doubt that the judge, a widely respected senior jurist, see here, did not intend this impression. But such personal anecdotes risk being seen as having little to do with the primary role and function of the court to resolve disputes and could be regarded instead as self-serving.  When personal judicial anecdotes focus attention away from legal issues and onto the personal importance and experience of the adjudicative official, judges should consider not employing this technique to make their points.  Of course, the best way to avoid this risk entirely would be to not use personal anecdotes to buttress legal reasoning at all.

4.  Making Up Your Own Mind - The Most Powerful Conclusion

    Since I was a law student, I have continuously heard a seemingly simple assertion about legal writing.  That is: "just tell a story".  Given the centrality of narrative in law, this is, in some ways, good advice.4

     Usually people will say it is good advice in legal writing because narrative structure has a centuries long pedigree of capably communicating ideas, values, culture and helping people to visualize circumstances.  For judgment writing, such structure may be very persuasive in getting others to agree to the legitimacy of legal determinations.  There is an extended analysis possible here to test these propositions, that may have to wait for a future blog (at least 1!).3

      Suffice to say for now that I have come to question "the story" and its benefit to legal writing.  Briefly, narrative has certain general requirements - such as a hero, a villain - as well as certain structural features - such as a beginning and end, a crisis and a conflict.4  In this context, narrative models for judgment writing are not inherently 'neutral' and may unfairly tend to highlight certain things and diminish others for the sake of 'the story'.  In other cases, litigants may wish to resolve their disputes without the addition of such dramatic characterizations, which may also belie their own perception of what actually happened, and be far removed from the gritty specificity and mundanity of daily existence.5

     The use of "stories" in law can often be very effective.  But the most adept advocates also have a capacity to set out relevant facts and law in a way that compels a favourable judicial interpretation of their case.  From the facts and law simply presented, the decision-maker may come to their own conclusion.  Similarly, in conveying these conclusions in legal judgments, an effective approach is one that allow facts and law to speak for themselves, in a way that makes the ultimate determination inevitable (at least apparently).  In this case, judges should also try to remember that amongst the most powerful conclusions are those which people come to on their own.

    The 'story' in law still has its uses and benefits in legal writing.  No ordering of facts and law, even absent an explicit structure, is likely completely neutral.  In addition, even without obvious narrative, this form may exert a powerful influence on people's thinking, so it may be impossible to avoid 'stories' in judgment writing.  But I also think that we should be mindful of potential side-effects and risks of intentionally using narrative structure and techniques to persuade in law. 

5.     Conclusion

     This blog has looked at the pitfalls of writing legal judgments as a "mystery novel", of some risks in using personal anecdotes in decisions, as well as the possible unwanted side-effects of narrative structure in law.   Judgment writing is a substantial challenge, and something of a talent.  But it is also a skill, that like all skills can be improved by most adjudicative officials through practice, reflection and constructive feedback.  Hopefully most can avoid some of the pitfalls, set out above, as well as broader challenges, and continue to render good decisions in the best traditions of the bench.

 

1.   Here I am quoting the remembrance of a frequent admonition from my former 1L contracts instructor, Professor David Mullan.
2.  The doctrine of judicial notice has been the subject of some extensive and substantive controversy in the past in Canada, see eg the case of R v S (RD) [1997] 3 SCR 484.
3.   And a vast body of scholarship devoted to many aspects of the law and literature perspective, including the well known work by White, James B, The Legal Imagination Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought and Expression. (Boston, Little Brown: 1973).
4.  See eg, Peter Brooks, "Narrative in and of the Law", in A Companion to Narrative Theory 415 (James Phelan & Peter J. Rabinowitz eds, 2005).
5.  See eg Alan Dershowitz, "Life Is Not a Dramatic Narrative" in Peter Brooks,  Law’s Stories 14, 16, Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds ,(Yale UP: 1998).

Loyalty, Conflicts & Judicial Writing in an Ontario Family Law Decision

1.         Introduction

A recent Ontario family law decision considered the lawyers’ conflicts rules in the context of a family law proceeding.  The case is unusual in that it presents a rare consideration of professional and ethical obligations for lawyers, by a Court at first instance.

The ruling highlights the respective roles of the Courts and Law Societies in lawyer professionalism.  The judgment also examines obligations to former family law clients under the duty of loyalty.  Last, the decision touches on the questions of appropriate judicial writing practices.

The rest of this blog critically examines these issues and identifies some potential weaknesses in the legal reasoning utilized in this case.  I conclude that some parts of the law of lawyers’ conflicts and the duty of loyalty are not well described in the decision and that the jurisprudential value of the case may therefore be limited.

2.         Background Facts 

The June 17, 2016 Ontario Superior Court decision in Hogarth v Hogarth[1] involved a motion for disqualification in a matrimonial dispute. Several months prior to the start of the spousal litigation in 2015 between the Hogarths, a third party, Mr. Antony “Nella”, consulted with the lawyer Mr. Harold “Niman”.  Nella was seeking to retain Niman in relation to his own separate matrimonial dispute. 

As later became clear,[2] Nella was also dating the wife, named Constance Hogarth, in the underlying matrimonial dispute, and was described by the Court as her “boyfriend”.  Ultimately Nella did not retain Niman after his consultation.  Niman went on to represent the husband, Timothy Hogarth, in the litigation that was commenced a few months later.

The 2016 motion before the Court made a number of assertions in relation to the lawyer’s professional obligations.  These included that Niman breached his duties of confidentiality, loyalty and candour to Nella.  The motion also objected to Niman’s sharing of the file and information about Nella with his own counsel, and to the possibility that the lawyer might have to cross-examine the “boyfriend” who had earlier sought to retain him.

3.         The Law of Conflicts

The Court considered in some detail the duties owed to former clients,[3] and the test set out in MacDonald Estate v Martin.[4] That is:

The court must determine (i) did the lawyer receive confidential information to a solicitor and client relationship relevant to the matter at hand and (ii) is there a risk that it will be used to the prejudice of the client.

The Court went to quote Macdonald Estate with respect to the well-known conflicts of interest test about whether two matters are “sufficiently related”:

If a former client can establish that there existed a previous relationship which is sufficiently related to the retainer from which it is sought to remove the solicitor, the court should infer that confidential information was imparted which could be relevant “unless the solicitor satisfies the court that no information was imparted which could be relevant”.[5]

The Court reviewed the case law and further jurisprudential refinements on these legal tests and observed the test for removal of a lawyer because of a conflict of interest is an objective, reasonable person test.[6]  Last the Court also noted,[7] where the former client cannot establish a sufficient relationship between two matters, it can still lead evidence that the lawyer or law firm actually possesses relevant confidential information.

4.         The Findings

The Court reviewed the nature of the relation, communications and documents exchanged between the two, but found no grounds to support a claim that the matters were ‘sufficiently related’.[8]  The Court also found that Nella did not establish that Niman actually possessed relevant confidential information.^[9]

The Court also reviewed what it characterized as the two aspects of the duty of loyalty owed to former clients.  The first is the risk identified in McKercher, to refrain from using confidential information.[10]  The Court also identified a more limited “narrow duty”, where the chance that confidential information being at risk is absent,[11] but where a lawyer might undermine the previous legal work of a former client by taking an adversarial position in current litigation.  

The Court also found no evidence to support a limited duty of loyalty owed by Niman and also no evidence to support a claim of conflict, without some connection in the legal work between the Nella and Hogarth litigation matters.  In this respect the Court determined that there was no evidence that Niman was taking an adversarial position with respect to issues arising from the Nella litigation.[12]  In the end the Court did not allow the motion to succeed.

5.         Discussion

i)          Courts Have Discretion to Enforce Lawyer Professionalism.

I’ve noted previously the judicial assertion that the authority of Ontario’s Law Society is “unqualified” in professional regulation.  Such statements are likely overly broad in general. More specifically though, this case shows the institutional independence of law societies to enforce professional standards is qualified by the role of the Courts, who also retain significant discretion to engage in examinations of lawyers’ professional conduct.

The fact it was the Court that considered the professional obligations of a lawyer in this family matter may also explain why there was no reference to the Law Society’s Rules of Conduct.  The lawyer rules do not provide a definitive guide of procedural conduct and there are other sources for lawyer ethical obligations, including case law. 

However, it is disappointing that the decision relied entirely on jurisprudence, given these professional obligations are spelled out in some detail in the Rules.  For example, despite the central question of conflicts in this case, at no point in the decision did the Court expressly consider the regulatory definition of a professional conflict of interest or the scope of the duty to avoid conflicts within the professional Rules.[13] 

ii)         What, Exactly, Is The Duty of Loyalty?

The analysis contained within the judgment may also have missed or conflated some of the applicable professional obligations under the lawyers’ duty of loyalty. As noted in the Rules, the duty of loyalty is the overarching obligation owed by lawyers to all clients.  It is usually described as consisting of four separate parts: the duty of confidentiality; and the duty to avoid conflicting interests; the duty to commit to the client’s cause, and; the duty of candour. [14]

However, in this case, the judge seems to have directly considered only parts of the duty of loyalty: first, the possible breach of ‘confidence’; then, the duty of loyalty owed to former clients, and; finally, the duty of candour. 

iii)        Confidentiality

The Court noted the jurisprudential recognition of the especial importance of confidentiality in family law matters.[15]  However, the Court found the matters were not ‘sufficiently related’ enough to infer that confidential information, if it existed, would be misused.[16]  The judge also found after a review of the nature of the relation, communications and documents, that there was not ‘clear and cogent’ evidence that the matters were sufficiently related enough to disqualify Niman.[17]

In a related finding later in the decision, the Court also found that since no disqualifying confidential information was received by Niman, the possible cross-examination of Nella by Niman in the Hogarth proceeding would be appropriate.[18]

As a final element of the lawyers’ confidentiality obligation, the judge also considered the appropriateness of the lawyer retaining his own counsel to represent him in the motion. On this point, the Court accepted the acquiescence of opposing counsel to not pursue the issue.  Here, again, though the Ontario professional Rules speak directly to such circumstances, they were not referred to in the judgment.[19] 

iv)        Duty of Loyalty and Commitment To a Client’s Cause

The Court also considered the duty of loyalty as a separate obligation seemingly distinguishable from the ‘law of conflicts’.[20]   After canvassing the case law, the Court determined that absent a breach of confidence, the duty of loyalty to a former client in this respect is limited “to attacking or undermining in a subsequent retainer the legal work which the lawyer did for the former client”.[21] 

However, these passages arguably conflate some aspects of the duty of loyalty.  For example, while touching on the ‘law of conflicts’, this aspect of the overall duty of loyalty is perhaps better understood as part of the separate duty of commitment to a client’s cause.  At the termination of the professional relation, this duty of commitment remains in part to prevent a future adverse interest from interfering with the ongoing loyalty to the legal interests of a former client.

v)         Duty of Candour

The Court did consider the final aspect of the duty of loyalty in several paragraphs and found this duty was not breached.[22]  While the findings with respect to the duty of candour are consistent with other determinations in the decision, there is little reference to any legal authority in relation to the scope and nature of the obligation.[23] 

This gap may be partly understandable in the sense that there remains scant interpretive jurisprudence about the duty of candour in Canadian law.  However, like the other three aspects of the duty of loyalty, there is some regulatory guidance and commentary, which arguably might have helpfully supported the Court’s determination in this instance.[24]

6.         Some Last Thoughts & Conclusion

As a final thought, the forms of address employed by the Court in this decision are somewhat troubling.  It is not clear why, but the judge consistently refers to the moving parties and husband throughout the judgment by versions of their first names (“Connie”, “Tim” & “Antony”).  By contrast the lawyer, whose professional conduct was challenged in the motion, is always referred to by his last name.

I think this observation touches on the recent discussion in Canada of the appropriateness of judicial writing styles, see e.g. here.  In this case, it’s possible that a judicial writing style that uses first names, and in two cases here a diminutive form of the litigants’ given names, could be perceived as overly familiar or even patronizing by some.

Such a possible perception may be especially problematic where an adjudicative official differentiates their manner of address and uses a more formal surname to identify one of the parties, as occurred in this case.  Consequently, to the extent that such a perception might be reasonable, in my opinion the employment of first names in this way is a judicial writing technique that ought to be discouraged.

In the end, the Ontario Superior Court decision in Hogarth provides a rare example of the consideration of lawyer professionalism issues by the Court directly in a family dispute.  I have deliberately refrained from questions about the ultimate determination.  This is partly because my opinion and feelings about the legal reasoning here are mixed, as set out above, but also because my purpose instead was to consider the application of the law in an important and developing area of lawyer professionalism.  

Ultimately, aspects of the legal reasoning within the decision appear confusing in relation to the applicable law of lawyers’ conflicts.  As a result, this case may not prove especially helpful in advancing the jurisprudence on these issues.

---

[1] Citations are to CanLii, embedded.  Also reported at 131 OR (3d) 736; 2016 ONSC 3875 ["Hogarth"].

[2] The Court determined that Niman was not notified about the nature of the relation between the wife and Nella at the consultation meeting, at para 70, and even if he was, it was not sufficient grounds for removal, at para 78

[3] At para 23.

[4] MacDonald Estate v. Martin, [1990] 3 SCR 1235; cited to QL, [1990] 3 SCR 1235, at para 45 [MacDonald Estate"].

[5] My emphasis, at para 29,  citing MacDonald Estate, supra note 4 at para. 46

[6] Such as, at paras 30 and 35, the SCC decision in Canadian National Railway Co v McKercher, 2013 SCC 39 (CanLII) (“McKercher”).

[7] Supra note 1 at para 41.

[8] Ibid at paras 62, 72, 84, 87, 88 - 89

[9] Ibid at para 90.

[10] Ibid at para 93, citing McLachlin CJ at para 23 of McKercher, supra note 4 .

[11] Ibid citing, at para 101, Cromwell JA’s remarks at para 51 of  Brookville Carriers Flatbed GP Inc. v. Blackjack Transport Ltd., 2008 NSCA 22 (CanLII) (“Brookville Carriers”).

[12] Ibid, at paras 104 – 105.

[13] Rules of Professional Conduct, [Rules] at 3.4-1.

[14] Ibid, at 3.4-1 & Commentary [4].

[15] Supra note 1, at para 27.

[16] Ibid, at para 55.

[17] Ibid, at para 88.

[18] Ibid, para 115.

[19] Supra note 13 at 3.3-6

[20] Supra  note 1, para 92 – 93. Based on CJ McLachlin’s comments in McKercher at para 23.

[21] Ibid, para 102.

[22] Ibid, paras 108 to 110.

[23] The Court does reference McKercher, supra note 4, at para 108.

[24] Supra, 3.2-2 and commentary in Rules, at note 13.

Sorry Shakespeare: Precedent, Roncarelli, and Misremembering Edwards on #PersonsDay

With apologies to the Bard,[1] I’ve come to the conclusion that in law, sometimes the fault lies not in our stars, but in our stare decisis.  In many ways, legal precedents are less like a north star, fixed in the firmament, and more like an inconstant moon,[2] that waxes and wanes with the passage of time.  Literary and stellar comparisons aside, it is in this last sense that I think a true appreciation of law requires an understanding of its temporal quality.

These effects are apparent in both principle and in practice.    In common law, the principle of stare decisis means taking a legal precedent articulated in earlier cases, and applying it to determine current legal issues.  The effects of this process make law inherently historical in the sense that, to paraphrase David Luban, all legal argument represents an attempt to infuse the past with present meaning.[3]

If legal argument is in part a looking backwards, then it’s also often an attempt to project into the future.  Legal decision-makers apply precedent in current cases.  Sometimes novel factual circumstances or theoretical reinterpretations require that a longstanding holding in law be adapted in new ways.  In this manner, a present legal decision and a fresh precedent can serve as a prospective guide for new jurisprudence. 

This temporal complexity in considering the function of stare decisis is, of course, one that some of the great minds of legal philosophy, like Jeremy Waldron, have considered in some detail, see eg here.  I love, for example, the quote from Schauer that I think captures the spirit of this principle of dynamic interaction in law over time.  He says, “today is not only yesterday’s tomorrow, it is also tomorrow’s yesterday”.[4]  

As a matter of practice in Canada, the dynamic function of stare decisis means that over time the perceived significance of a legal decision may change.  Eric Adams recently presented an interesting example of this phenomena in the context of the famous Roncarelli v Duplessis case.[5]  This decision remains one of the most commonly cited decisions in Canadian public law, though the main reasons why seem to have shifted. 

Today it is most commonly associated with law, constitutionalism and limits on governmental authority.  However, at various times the case has also been highlighted as an example of the limits of provincial legislation or to explain the pre-Charter scope of freedom of religion.  More broadly, for decades in Canadian legal classrooms, the case was used to describe the scope of common-law legal rights.[6]

The perceived significance of a decision can change over time in law, but also in the popular imagination.  This was made very apparent on my social media feed on October 18th, which was the 87^th anniversary of another important legal decision in Edwards v Canada (AG).  This case is more commonly know as the Persons Case, because the decision of the British Judicial Committee of the Privy Council interpreted a constitutional provision that only “qualified persons” could be appointed to the Canadian Senate to include women.  The anniversary of this case is popularly referred to by some on social media as #PersonsDay.

Despite that seemingly straightforward description, the popular significance of the case appears somewhat misunderstood.  The most common misperception I saw was that the Persons Case was directly connected to women earning the right to vote, which is categorically untrue. 

Others thought that prior to the case, women in Canada could not hold public office.  While women could not be appointed to the Senate until the legal decision, women held a wide variety of public offices, including as provincial MLAs, judicial officials and as Members of Parliament. 

Others seemed to think that it was only by reason of the Court’s interpretation of the constitutional term “qualified persons” as a requirement for Senatorial appointment, that women were recognized as ‘people’, which is at best, inaccurate.

I was, frankly, a little astounded at the numerous individuals, including several elected Canadian officials, who misstated the importance of the Persons Case in public postings on October 19^th, including at least one Member of Parliament, see here, and the current Premier of British Columbia, see here. 

For those interested, the Historica #HeritageMinute video, from the perspective of Emily Murphy, one of the 'Famous Five' in this event, is here.

To be fair though, these politicians were not alone, and there were numerous examples of others who misunderstood or appeared ignorant of what the case actually stands for, see the #PersonsDay tag on Twitter for many more such examples.

In any event, how precedent is remembered popularly and in law, along with how it is sometimes uncertainly applied is one of the things I’ve been thinking a lot about in my research and writing.  In this respect, as someone whose initial training was in history, I was happy to see that #PersonsDay was being celebrated, but also a bit perplexed that the legal importance of the Persons Case appears to be so often misunderstood.

---

[1] The quote from Shakespeare is more accurately “the fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars / But in ourselves,” Julius Caesar, Act I, Scene III.

[2] Science fiction fans will know this alludes to Larry Niven’s short story of the same name, in which lunar inconstancy symbolizes change, but also foreshadows a global apocalypse.

[3] David Luban, “Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr King”, 87 Michigan L R 2152 (1982) as quoted in J Feinberg & J Coleman eds, Philosophy of Law, (Wadsworth/Thompson Learning, Belmont CA, 2000) at 227.

[4] Frederick Schauer, “Precedent”, (1987) 39 Stanford L R, 571 at 575.

[5] Eric M Adams, “Building a Law of Human Rights: Roncarelli v Duplessis in Canadian Constitutional Culture” (2010) 55 McGill LJ 437 which is available online through SSRN < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2030502>.

[6] Ibid.

Independence & CPD in the Camp Inquiry & the Green Appeal

1.                  Introduction

            My last blog briefly surveyed some recent and ongoing cases that appear to be refining the principle of independence of the Bar in Canada.  A further case, Sidney Green v Law Society of Manitoba (Green), will soon be before the Supreme Court and is scheduled for hearing this November 9, 2016. This matter involves a senior lawyer from Manitoba, who is challenging the imposition of mandatory continuing legal education by that province’s Law Society. 

            I previously also noted that the refinement of ideas about independence for lawyers has a long interrelation with the development of judicial independence.  The simultaneity of similar issues, between the bench and the Bar, is also apparent in current developments in Canadian law.  In this respect, questions about mandatory legal education for judges is also an aspect of the current Canadian Judicial Council (CJC) Inquiry into the behaviour of Justice Robin Camp. 

            This blog examines the principle of independence for judges and lawyers in these cases, as it relates to mandatory legal education.  As I previously noted in the context of Bar, ‘independence’ has been a dynamic principle in Canadian law.  But, based on the consideration of independence in the context of mandatory legal education set out below, I conclude that for both lawyers and judges, it is also subject to limits justified by its broader public purpose. 

2.                  CJC Judicial Inquiry

            Justice Robin Camp is a federal judge and the subject of a current Inquiry into his behaviour before the CJC.  The issue underlying the Inquiry involves Justice Camp’s behaviour and language in a sexual assault trial over which he presided prior to his federal appointment. The matter has received considerable national attention, eg see here, and raises a host of questions, particularly with regard to the effectiveness of judicial discipline in Canada. 

            Questions about the effectiveness of judicial discipline in Canada have recently led the federal Minister of Justice to engage in a public consultation about the process of Judicial Inquires and the role of the CJC. See recent news reports and commentary on this consultation, eg here and here.

            The current Inquiry into Justice Camp’s conduct has also highlighted the issue of judicial education.  One view is that the judge’s impugned behaviour was based in his lack of knowledge and training about sexual assault law.  Such positions raise concerns about the extent to which judges should be subject to mandatory legal education and training. 

            It could be argued, for example, that imposing a requirement of legal education disrespects the principle of individual independence, in the sense that judges are supposed to be free from interference in their adjudicative roles.  As suggested in this news article, which also interviews former Supreme Court of Canada  Justice Thomas Cromwell, the imposition of mandatory judicial education could be viewed as a "potentially dangerous incursion on judicial independence".

            At the same time that questions about discipline and mandatory legal education are under scrutiny in the Camp proceeding, similar concerns in the context of the Bar are also likely to be important in the upcoming Green litigation before the Supreme Court, examined below.

3.                  Green v Law Society of Manitoba

            Mr. Sydney Green is a senior lawyer in Manitoba who was subject to suspension by the provincial Law Society in 2014 because he did not complete a mandatory requirement for annual Continuing Professional Development (CPD).  While expressing some support for the idea of lawyer education, see here, Mr. Green objected to both the mandatory nature of the CPD requirement and to the specific authority of the Manitoba Law Society, as well as the process used, to potentially suspend his licence to practice law, and subsequently brought the issue to court. 

            Undeterred by his loss at the provincial Court of Appeal in 2015, Green sought to appeal the matter to the Supreme Court, which granted leave last December, see here.   The factums of the parties, and the intervener Federation of Law Societies of Canada (FLSC), are publicly available at the Supreme Court of Canada website, here. An interesting question to me in this case is why exactly the Supreme Court granted leave to hear this matter.

            As set out in R v Hinse (1995), the Court has a wide discretion to grant or deny leave to appeal, that does not necessarily depend on the correctness of the result at the lower court.  Typically leave is granted when one of several issues also arises.  These include: whether the case raises a novel point of law; a conflict between courts of appeal in different provinces on a similar issue, the interpretation of a statute that exists in several jurisdictions, or; the presence of an important constitutional issue.

            However, in this case the authority of Canadian law societies to regulate the profession in the public interest has been recognized for a long time and recently, for example, in the recent Groia decision from the Ontario Court of Appeal, see my previous blog commenting on this case. In addition, the requirement for continuing legal education and CPD has been largely accepted, in most if not all jurisdictions, as an important aspect of lawyer professionalism, eg para 18 of FLSC intervener factum.

            Furthermore, even though there might be technical differences in the various provincial and territorial statutes authorizing legal regulators, they have been afforded a wide and generally recognized underlying authority by courts to self-regulate the legal profession,   In the past, this has included authority to regulate and to discipline lawyers for matters not specifically set out, as may be an issue in Green, see eg, the Supreme Court's Jabour decision. 

            However, I do think that this case potentially raises an issue about the status of the principle of independence of the Bar, that as I highlighted in my last blog, is becoming an increasingly important aspect of Canadian legal culture.  Here, I think the distinct role of lawyer self-regulation in Canada, and the relationship between the institutional and individual aspects of independence of the Bar is one that is likely to be more fully articulated in this case.

            If the old adage that bad facts make bad law is true, then I think there may be some reason to believe that the relatively straightforward nature of the facts underlying the Green matter may provide the Supreme Court an uncontroversial opportunity to lay down some refinements about an important legal and constitutional principle. Such refinements may useful in its consideration of more complex cases in the future dealing with Bar independence and the role of Law Societies.

4.                  Conclusion

            Concerns about mandatory legal education raised by the Green and Camp proceedings appear to overlap to some extent.  Both deal with independent officials operating in the justice system.  Positions opposing legal education and CPD suggest a perspective that the mandatory nature of such programs could inappropriately trench on either judicial or lawyer independence.  Both cases also raise questions about the role and function of individual independence and its governance through institutions such as the CJC and law societies.  In this respect, the question of mandatory continuing legal education for judges and lawyers is one that appears to have a number of similarities.    

            I think the issue of mandatory legal education in relation to judges and lawyers is one that is also connected by a common purpose.  Ongoing professional education can help both judges and lawyers address gaps in knowledge and skills and keep them apprised of current developments in the law.  In this respect, mandatory education for judges and CPD for lawyers, would appear to be in the broader public interest, to enhance the effectiveness of the justice system and its individual officials. While possibly limiting autonomy, the qualification on independence would nonetheless be consistent with the conditional nature of the principle in Canada.  Comparing the circumstances in the Camp Inquiry and in the Green litigation also provides a further and modern example of the simultaneity between independence issues for lawyers and judges, and the ongoing connection between the two in Canadian legal culture.